Attacking the Trade Deficit by Unkovic, Dennis
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 6 Issue 1 
1984 
Attacking the Trade Deficit 
Dennis Unkovic 
Meyer, Unkovic & Scott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dennis Unkovic, Attacking the Trade Deficit, 6 MICH. J. INT'L L. 47 (1984). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol6/iss1/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Attacking the Trade Deficit
Dennis Unkovic*
In the United States (U.S.), policy planning for industrial development is not
new.' The federal government currently formulates and implements policies de-
signed to foster the growth of the industrial sector. The current debate should not
focus on the merits of a comprehensive national industrial policy over federal
non-involvement, rather it should address the degree to which the federal govern-
ment should become involved in specific areas affecting industrial development.
This article will analyze the appropriate role for the federal government in its
efforts to eliminate the current U.S. balance of trade deficit.
The U.S. suffered a shocking trade imbalance in 1983.2 Unfortunately, 1984
was much worse, and most experts agree that the deficit will continue to deepen
in the foreseeable future. 3 This problem demands attention because it affects the
overall health of the U.S. economy.4 Increasing pressure for a definitive federal
response is emerging from Congress, injured sectors of U.S. industry, organized
labor, and Wall Street. Although representatives of these groups span the political
spectrum, few oppose action at the federal level.5 Partisan politics will not result
in a genuine long-term solution to the trade imbalance. The reasoned attention of
all policy makers is required.
The U.S. must decide if a comprehensive national industrial policy focusing
*Partner, Meyer, Unkovic & Scott. B.A. 1970, University of Virginia; J.D. 1973, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. On February 8, 1984, the Democratic members of the House Banking Subcommittee on Eco-
nomic Stabilization unanimously voted to create a Council on Industrial Competitiveness and a Bank
for Industrial Competitiveness. The stated purpose of the Council and the Bank is to increase the
competitiveness of U.S. industries. 20 U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 18, at 645-46 (Feb. 14,
1984).
2. The 1983 U.S. trade deficit was $57.6 billion based upon FA.S. exports of $200.5 billion and
imports of $258 billion if valued on a customs basis (international freight, costs, and insurance
excluded). If imports are viewed from a C.IF. basis, the deficit increases to $69.4 billion. U.S. Trade
Outlook, Bus. AM., Feb. 20, 1984, at 2-5.
3. U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge expects the deficit to climb to over $130 billion in
1984. The deficit figure for October 1984 was $8.9. 1 IrNr'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 728-29
(Dec. 12, 1984).
4. The U.S. devotes an increasing share of its GNP to two-way, export-import trade: 20 percent of
GNP in 1982 and less than nine percent in 1960. Total U.S. export-import trade increased from $35
billion in 1960 to $467 billion in 1982. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, GIST:
U.S. TRADE POLICY (Feb. 1984) [hereinafter cited as U.S. TRADE POLICY].
5. See, e.g., Industrial Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic Stabilization of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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exclusively on pre-selected industries will counteract the mounting U.S. trade
deficit or if a less centralized response is more likely to be successful. A limited
federal response directed at all manufacturing and service sectors would help
ameliorate this complex problem. This article reviews traditional governmental
responses to the trade deficit and then analyzes the Export Trading Company Act
of 1982,6 a concrete example of the type of limited federal approach suggested
above.
I. TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO THE U.S. TRADE
DEFICIT
A trade deficit exists when a nation imports more goods and services than it
exports. A continuing trade deficit adversely affects any government's financial
structure and the underlying health of its industrial sectors. A government facing
a trade deficit must simultaneously pursue two courses of action. On the one
hand, it must decide if, and to what degree, it will erect artificial barriers to
foreign competition in order to minimize import injury to domestic industries.
On the other, it must find a way to increase domestic exports.
A. Import Restraints
In response to constituent pressure, Congress has created several types of
legislative barriers to imports. Its most recent initiatives, contained in the Trade
and Tariff Act of 1984, were enacted into law on October 30, 1984.1 Most of these
barriers are applicable only to so-called "unfair" imports. The statutes them-
selves define "unfair." If imports do not meet these criteria, they may still be
barred by the escape clause of the Trade Act of 1974.8 "Unfair" imports are
subject to several legislative sanctions.
Section 731 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the antidumping provision,
makes it illegal for a foreign manufacturer to sell its products in the U.S. market
at less than their fair value in the home country.9 This statute establishes a
6. The Export Trading Company Act, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as ETCA].
7. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948. President Reagan hailed the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 as the most important trade law approved in a decade. Remarks on
Signing H.R. 3398 into Law, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1687 (Oct. 30, 1984). In addition to its
initiatives regarding import restraints, the Act includes a provision designed to give the U.S. Govern-
ment greater leverage in dismantling barriers to services regularly used by our trading partners. Pub.
L. No. 98-573, § 305, 98 Stat. at 3006 (1984). This is a crucial step in realigning the U.S. trade
deficit as world trade in services now exceeds $350 billion annually. See U.S. TRADE POLICY, supra
note 4. The Act also extends the Generalized System of Preferences until July 1993. Pub. L. No.
98-573, § 506, 98 Stat. at 3006 (1984). This provision provides the President with the flexibility to
respond to changing circumstances within the developing nations with whom the U.S. trades. Other
provisions of the Act are targeted specifically to the U.S. steel industry, id. at §§ 801-807, 98 Stat. at
3043-47 (1984), domestic wine producers, id. at §§ 901-907, 98 Stat. at 3047-50 (1984), and trade
with Israel, id. at §§ 401-406, 98 Stat. at 3013-18.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982) (frequently referred to as § 201 of the Trade Act of 1974).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982).
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procedure to guarantee that the price of a good sold in the U.S. equals the price
charged in the manufacturer's home market. The basic factual issues to be re-
solved in section 731 cases are whether the imported goods are being dumped on
the U.S. market at below home market selling prices and whether U.S. manufac-
turers have consequently suffered injury. The U.S. steel industry has frequently
sought protection from foreign competitors under the 1979 antidumping provi-
sion. Amendments contained in Title VI of the 1984 Act will make it easier to
prove the allegations necessary to obtain protection. The new act also streamlines
procedural hearing requirements and makes it easier for small companies to bring
antidumping suits.10
Imports can also be challenged when a foreign country directly or indirectly
subsidizes the production or exportation of products. To counteract these sub-
sidies, section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes the U.S. government to
impose a countervailing duty on imported goods. I The countervailing duty adds
a premium equal to the amount of the actual subsidy in the country of origin, thus
eliminating foreign producers' advantage over U.S. producers. The 1984 Trade
Act eases requirements for the application of countervailing duties. It allows the
U.S. Government to adjust the price of the foreign import where "upstream"
subsidies have been bestowed on the producer by a foreign government. 2
Other solutions to "unfair" import competition are contained in section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.13 These statutes are designed to prevent unfair methods of
foreign competition that might lead to destruction of, or substantial injury to, an
efficient U.S. industry. Additionally, the President has the power, under section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974, to retaliate against foreign practices which are
found to be "unjustifiable, discriminatory, or which unreasonably restrain U.S.
commerce." 14 Through development of a reciprocity theory, Title III of the 1984
Act clarifies and strengthens this power. 5 Other unfair import laws afford relief
where a communist country disrupts the U.S. market 16 or where the national
security of the United States is threatened by specific unfair activities.17
Statutory authority also exists to halt the import of goods which are harmful to
the economy, although they may not be defined as legally "unfair." Under
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the Escape Clause, domestic producers may
petition the International Trade Commission for temporary relief from imports. 8
The theory behind section 201 actions is that certain domestic industries need a
reasonable time to adjust to unexpectedly strong foreign competition. Fair import
provisions can buy a short space of breathing room for American producers.
Despite the 1984 Trade and Tariff Act's apparent bias toward freer application
of import restraints, there are continuing difficulties with the mechanisms de-
10. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 601-626, 98 Stat. at 3024-43 (1984).
II. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
12. Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 613, 98 Stat. at 3035 (1984).
13. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982).
14. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982).
15. See Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 304, 98 Stat. at 3002 (1984).
16. See 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1982).
17. See 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982). 18. 19 U.S.C. 2251 (1982).
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
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signed to block or delay fair and unfair imports. First, the necessary fact-finding
procedures take a significant amount of time. Whether undertaken by the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the
RTeasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, or the White House, there are always
delays between the filing of the petition and governmental response. Second,
legal and administrative costs discourage all but the most severely affected or
well-organized domestic industry groups. Finally, the direct involvement of the
White House, required by many of these procedures, means that political consid-
erations inevitably affect their outcome. As a result, the protective import statutes
at best tend to maintain the status quo or temporarily roll back imports. They do
little to correct the overall trade problem, since they affect only a narrow range of
imports and do nothing to encourage exports.
B. Export Development
In addition to administering statutory import restraints, the government par-
ticipates in activities designed to increase exports. The International Trade
Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce (ITA) encourages U.S.
companies to participate in trade shows and trade fairs outside the U.S. to
showcase U.S. products and services for foreign buyers. The ITA employs
country specialists who are knowledgeable about geographic regions and product
areas. These specialists provide advice to U.S. exporters without charge. 19
The U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, now part of the U.S. Department
of Commerce, provides the ITA with an international resource network. Foreign
Commercial Officers with private business backgrounds are stationed in U.S.
embassies and consular offices worldwide. They provide on-the-spot advice to
U.S. businessmen overseas and answer commercial inquiries generated by the 47
ITA offices in cities throughout the United States.
The Commerce Department is not the only governmentally-financed export
advisor. Other parts of the federal government provide specialized help for ex-
porters. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture maintains extensive
programs to assist U.S. agricultural producers in exporting.
The need for adequate financing of export-related transactions is a universal
problem. The Export-Import Bank of the United States is the major vehicle for
the quasi-governmental financing of and credit guarantees for U.S. exporters of
goods and services. Until recently, the bulk of the loan guarantees provided by
the Export-Import Bank went to large infrastructure projects and major industry
groups such as the U.S. airframe companies. Congressional and self-imposed
restrictions on the scope of the Export-Import Bank's authority made it difficult
for the Export-Import Bank to provide financing packages that were competitive
with those offered by its counterparts in other countries. However, during the last
18 months the Export-Import Bank has begun to shift its attention away from big
transactions, choosing instead to emphasize aid to medium and smaller-sized
exporters.
19. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1984-85, at 133-36 (1984).
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The Agency for International Development (AID) is another example of a
governmental attempt to help U.S. exporters. In the guise of foreign assistance,
AID projects can be useful to U.S. exporters. By offering foreign governments
financial aid which is tied to the purchase of U.S. goods and services, AID
generates U.S. exports.
Although the Export-Import Bank and AID help to finance export-related
transactions, the major responsibility for encouraging U.S. exports has devolved
on the ITA. In the past, most federal efforts have gone to protecting specific
domestic industries.
In a free society, governmental activities can only cut back historically high
levels of imports to a limited degree. Therefore, the government must find ways
to increase the quantity of exports so as to offset imports. This is a difficult task
because the vast majority of exports come from very few companies. The size,
growth patterns, and resources of the U.S. domestic economy placed U.S. com-
panies in an enviable position for 40 years. Traditionally, most U.S., companies
could satisfy their growth needs through the domestic market; they did not need
to look to export markets. Even today, less than one in ten U.S. companies export
goods and services. 20 Those that do are large multinational entities accustomed to
importing and exporting. They are the companies that benefit from existing
government programs designed to encourage exports.
The concentration of export activity among large U.S. multinationals is illus-
trated by a survey showing that less than one percent of the U.S. manufacturers
who export account for more than 80 percent of U.S. manufactured exports."
The only conclusion possible is that most small and medium-sized companies do
not export at all. If the trade equation is to be balanced, they must be encouraged
to enter into significant export activities.
22
Countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the United
Kingdom have never been able to rely on their domestic markets and resources.
Trade for them is a matter of economic survival, not convenience. The U.S. trade
deficit is reality manifesting itself in an outmoded American perception of the
world. While in 1960 only 25 percent of U.S. goods were subject to foreign
competition, the figure is now 75 percent. 23 Increasingly pervasive foreign com-
petition makes it all the more imperative that the U.S. increase exports to lower
its trade deficit.
II. ATTACKING THE TRADE DEFICIT-THE Two OPTIONS
If exports are to be increased by the entrance of new companies into interna-
tional trade, the U.S. must adopt a new approach to the trade deficit which either
20. S. REP. No. 27, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981).
21. Id.
22. A Commerce Department study revealed approximately 20,000 medium-sized producers that
do not presently produce products that would be competitive in world markets. H.R. REP. No. 629,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
23. Coyne, Building American Industry: Some Proposals for a New National Industrial Strategy,
Prlr. Bus. J., Feb. 8, 1984, at 3.
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bolsters or supplants existing programs and eliminates existing disincentives.
24
There are two alternatives.
A. A National Industrial Policy: Aid for Select Industries
Congress has the power to enact legislation establishing a national industrial
policy. This approach would place the federal government in the role of the
private entrepreneur. The government would select for export assistance those
industries it believed capable of world market competitiveness. Special tax incen-
tives, direct and indirect governmental financial assistance, and preferential treat-
ment would be given to encourage those industries chosen to undertake and
maintain an aggressive export posture.
The Japanese experience exemplifies this approach. Over the last 25 years, the
Japanese have targeted key industrial sectors including automobiles, steel, and,
most recently, new generation electronics technology. The positive results
achieved by a number of Japanese companies have led some U.S. policy makers
to decide that the U.S. should implement its own version of a national industrial
policy.
There are at least three serious problems in attempting to adopt for the United
States the structured, governmentally-controlled national industrial policy ap-
proach of other countries. First, the symbiotic relationship between the govern-
ment, financial institutions, private industry, and labor which exists in a country
like Japan is unlikely to be matched in the United States. Unfortunately, that type
of cooperation simply cannot be legislated into existence.
Second, the highly politicized U.S. system is unlikely to tolerate government
selection of certain industries for special assistance. It is hard to imagine the steel
industry readily accepting that the aluminum industry has been chosen for special
tax treatment and export incentives.
Third, the risks involved in guessing about the future by selecting a few
industries for assistance are too great. A wrong choice could have disastrous
consequences. Who in 1972 could have accurately foreseen the unbelievable rise
in the price of crude oil and the dislocating worldwide consequences? Which
government planner in 1973 could have accurately forecast that the Apple Com-
puter Company was right about the sudden growth of the micro-computer? For
these reasons, the national industrial policy alternative described above cannot
succeed in the United States.
24. One major disincentive for businessmen has been the possible application of U.S. antitrust
laws to U.S. companies that join together for collective exporting activities. Fear of involvement in
antitrust litigation initiated by the U.S. Department of Justice or their competitors has kept many
away from exporting. Whether or not this perception of the antitrust spectre is realistic, the reluctance
to form joint export groups is a fact of life in the U.S. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-2, 78f, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified in scattered sections of 7, 22, 26, 42 & 50 App. U.S.C.), which deal
with foreign boycott requests, have also discouraged small and medium-sized companies from trying
to export their products and services. The Internal Revenue Code cannot be overlooked, as its system
of taxation for foreign transactions can be particularly unfriendly to the uninitiated exporter.
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B. The Export Trading Company Act of 1982: Export Stimulus for
American Industry Generally
There is another way to attack the problem. The federal government could turn
its efforts to increasing both the quantity and range of goods and services ex-
ported by the U.S. In doing so it should not target just a few key export sectors as
it is unwise, for the reasons discussed previously, to place inordinate emphasis on
one or more sectors to the exclusion of others. Rather, it should create a federal
program spearheaded by legislative provisions encouraging small and medium-
sized companies to export and fostering more aggressive activities by current
exporters. Participation should be left to the industries themselves, not dictated
by centralized government planning. Flexibility is key to this effort. At the same
time, the government should deemphasize trade laws designed to protect U.S.
industries which cannot be competitive in international markets in the long run.
Congress took a key first step toward developing an atmosphere conducive to
exports with the passage of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982.25 It is an
excellent example of specifically-tailored legislation granting flexible options to
all U.S. industries. The Export Trading Company Act demonstrates that a work-
able framework for encouraging export activity is possible without centralized
governmental planning. This type of law, as opposed to a comprehensive national
industrial policy targeting only certain industries, holds promise as a valuable
tool for dealing with our trade deficit problem.
1. History of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
Seventy years ago, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook an exten-
sive study in response to complaints from U.S. companies that wanted to increase
their export sales.2 6 The Commission found that U.S. exporters focused their
complaints on two major barriers-the risk of antitrust prosecutions of U.S.
companies acting collectively overseas and the lack of adequate financing for
export transactions.
The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 was a partial congressional response. 27 The
Act gave limited antitrust immunity to groups of U.S. exporters collectively
selling products, not services, overseas.28 However, of the 250 diverse Webb-
Pomerene Associations formed during the past sixty years, fewer than forty are
still in operation. Most are product-driven export associations that do not promote
exports generally.29 In 1970, the FTC completed a retrospective analysis of the
effectiveness of Webb-Pomerene Associations.30 The FTC report concluded that
since fewer than two percent of U.S. exports were handled by existing Webb-
Pomerene Associations, the Webb-Pomerene approach was an inadequate solu-
tion to the antitrust uncertainties that Congress had attempted to address.
25. ETCA, supra note 6.
26. FED. TRADE COMM'N, COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT TRADE (1916).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1982).
29. STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT-WEBB-
POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50 YEAR REVIEW (1967).
30. FED. TRADE COMM'N, WEBB-POMORENE ASSOCIATIONS: TEN YEARS LATER (1978).
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As the trade deficit became a persistent phenomenon in the 1970s, Congress
again tried to determine why U.S. businesses believed they were unable to
compete in foreign markets. Ironically, they found that obstacles for businesses
were identical in 1979 and in 1916. The uneven and unpredictable application of
U.S. antitrust laws to international operations and the inadequacy of tax incen-
tives and financing aimed at exploiting foreign markets inhibited the export of
goods by U.S. companies during both periods.
Congress first attempted to address the issue in 1979. Senator Adlai Stevenson
introduced legislation to encourage the formation of U.S.-based export trading
companies. 3' His bill contained provisions offering tax, financing, antitrust, and
banking incentives, with broad application to U.S. exporters. Although passed
by the United States Senate, the legislation died in the House of Representatives
in 1980. In 1981, Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania introduced his own legisla-
tive package to encourage U.S. exporting. 32 The Heinz legislation passed the
Senate in March, 1981, with bipartisan support. In 1982 the House of Represen-
tatives approved its own version. With portions of the House and Senate versions,
the Export Trading Company Act of 198233 emerged from the Conference Com-
mittee and was signed by President Reagan on October 8, 1982.
The title of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 (ETCA) is somewhat
misleading. ETCA applies only in part to the organization and operation of
export trading companies. 34 Only Title II of ETCA applies specifically to export
trading companies and banks. It permits qualified U.S. banking entities to be-
come equity partners in export trading companies and to provide new services to
exporters. 35 The other provisions of Title II and Titles I, III, and IV of ETCA
benefit all U.S. exporters, not just trading companies. Titles 11136 and IV 37,
addressing specific antitrust concerns, offer benefits to most U.S. exporters.
While ETCA is no panacea for all the problems faced by U.S. exporters, the
law does create significant new opportunities which can help reduce the current
U.S. trade deficit. The following analysis highlights how the flexibility offered
31. S. 1663, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Changes to S. 1663 were incorporated in S. 2718, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), which passed the Senate 77-0.
32. S. 144, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981), was known as the Export Trading Act of 1981. After being
introduced, changes were made to S. 144 and it passed the Senate as S. 734, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981).
33. ETCA, supra note 6.
34. Trading companies are as old as commerce. The first trading companies were camel caravans.
As the sailing ship emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries, the great trading organizations like the East
India Tading Company were born. The best known trading companies today are Japanese, Korean,
Dutch and British. The largest market-driven Japanese companies are called Soga Shosha. By
definition, the trading company is an intermediary between buyer and seller. It can supply any or all
of the following services: initial market research, marketing assistance, financing, transportation,
insurance, communications, service outlets, and documentation. True trading companies will also on
occasion take title to the goods and relieve the seller of any risk. One of the purposes of ETCA was to
encourage the formation of U.S. based trading companies to help U.S. companies, particularly small
and medium-sized ones, to export. See Unkovic & LaMont, The Export Trading Company Act of
1982: Invitation to Aggressive Export Expansion, 87 DICK. L. REV. 205 (1983).
35. 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4, 1841-1843 (1982).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 4011-4022 (1982).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ l(note), 6a (1982).
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by this law differs from traditional U.S. government policy and argues against a
centralized planning approach embodied in a national industrial policy.
2. Title I of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
Extensive hearings convinced Congress that the U.S. trade picture could be
helped if U.S. companies began to establish trading companies similar to those
that the Japanese, Koreans, Dutch, and British have had for years. Export trading
companies can serve as efficient export mechanisms, particularly for small to
medium-sized companies which are too small individually to support a full scale
export-import operation.
Despite the name of the Act, congressional purpose, as expressed in Title I, is
far broader than promotion of U.S.-based export trading companies. Title I
contains a congressional mandate requiring United States companies to re-assert
themselves in the international market.38 Significantly, it encourages the export of
services as well as goods.
Title I of ETCA establishes the Office of Export Trading Company Affairs
within the U.S. Department of Commerce. 39 The Office is responsible for admin-
istering the "certification" of antitrust-related export activities of individual U.S.
companies, groups of companies, and U.S. export trading groups, as authorized
under Title III of ETCA. It also acts as a clearinghouse for U.S. companies
seeking existing trading companies to export their goods and services or com-
panies interested in joint export arrangements. The Office has already imple-
mented a formalized Contact Facilitation Program using a computerized data
bank program to bring together manufacturers and firms providing export ser-
vices by product line and geographic area.4°
The congressional intent to encourage exports rather than restrict imports is
new, as is the concept of encouraging all potential exporters rather than a desig-
nated few. Congress implements this philosophy in Titles II, III and IV.
3. Title I of the Bank Export Services Act of 1982
U.S. exporters have always complained of inadequate sources of private and
government financing to underwrite broad-based exporting efforts. U.S. banks
historically have been more reluctant to extend credit for export-related transac-
tions than have foreign financial institutions. In part this was due to the fact that
U.S. banking laws and practices dictated that banks cover their risks solely by the
"spread" on the funds lent. Prior to the passage of ETCA, U.S. banks and their
holding companies were prohibited from owning an equity position in trading
groups. As a result, they were unwilling to consider innovative financing pack-
ages and higher risks because of the limited nature of possible returns.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (1982).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1982).
40. Registration for the program is free. By completing Form ITA-721(7-82), any company or
individual can become a part of the data base. Forms are available from the Office of ETC Affairs of
the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce or from ITA offices located in
47 cities in the United States. Search requests are run on the basis of the type of service provided or
sought, geographic location, foreign market interest, and the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes for each product requested.
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Title II of ETCA, the Bank Export Services Act of 1982, represents a signifi-
cant departure from traditional U.S. banking policy.41 After reviewing the direct
involvement of many foreign banks in export-related activities, Congress decided
that U.S. banks, with some limitations, should be allowed to take part in the
action. In defined circumstances, qualified U.S. financial institutions 42 may now
make equity investments in export trading companies, export joint ventures, or
their own export-related operations. 43 This opens up a new area of potential
business for qualified financial institutions and will hopefully encourage potential
U.S. exporters.
The importance of the new ability of U.S. banking entities to invest in trading
companies and export-related activities is just beginning to be appreciated. As of
September 19, 1984, twenty-nine applications filed with the Federal Reserve had
been approved. It is interesting to note the size of the bank holding companies
which have filed. The applications range from some of the largest U.S. banks,
such as Bank of America and Citicorp, to strong regional banking institutions,
such as Fleet National Bank of Rhode Island, to a consortium of three small
banks in New Jersey. Foreign banks doing business in the U.S. will also take
advantage of this opportunity. One foreign bank has already filed with the Federal
Reserve 44 and others with representative offices in the United States are investi-
gating the possibility of setting up investment relationships under ETCA.
Section 206 of Title I14 mandates that the Export-Import Bank designate
specific credits for small and medium-sized U.S. exporters.4 6 This program is
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 1841 note (1982).
42. ETCA allows bank holding companies, Edge Act corporations, agreement corporations and
bankers' banks to make this type of investment.
43. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (1982). The amount of any qualified investment by a bank holding
company, banker's bank, agreement corporation, or Edge Act corporation (which is a subsidiary of a
bank holding company), is limited to five percent of its consolidated and capital surplus. An Edge Act
corporation that is not engaged in banking activities is limited to 25 percent of its consolidated capital
and surplus. To assure that banks will impartially issue credit to their own related export entities,
ETCA limits loans to ten percent of the bank holding company's consolidated capital and the surplus.
A bank-affiliated export entity may also not receive credit on terms which would be considered more
favorable than those offered to borrowers in similar circumstances.
The Federal Reserve Board, during hearings on ETCA legislation was highly critical of the
proposal permitting bank equity investment in this area. As a result, Congress, wishing to encourage
bank investment in trading companies, limited the Federal Reserve Board to a 60-day period follow-
ing filing of an application, to disapprove a proposed investment. If the Federal Reserve Board does
not act within 60 days, the applicant is free to proceed with the investment. In addition, the discretion
of the Federal Reserve in issuing disapprovals was statutorily limited by three narrow criteria. The
Federal Reserve Board, after passage of ETCA, issued regulations limiting the flexibility of the banks
as to collateralization of loans. This act has been criticized by members of the banking community.
As of October 1984, the Federal Reserve Board had not disapproved any application by a qualified
financial institution for an export-related investment.
44. The foreign bank is Rabobank Nederland, a branch of Cooperative Centrale Raijjeisen Boeren
Leenbank B.A. of the Netherlands.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 635a-4 (1982).
46. The Export-Import Bank has a number of programs available for various-sized businesses: the
ETCA Guarantee Program, Small Manufacturers Discount Loan Program, Medium Term Export
Sales Loans, Export Credit Insurance Program in Cooperation with the Foreign Credit Insurance
Association, and the Commercial Bank Guarantee Program.
TRADE DEFICIT 57
available regardless of whether the U.S. exporter is a trading company. Addi-
tionally, the Small Business Administration has initiated its own program for
small businesses with lines of credit of up to $500,000.11
Section 207 of Title II amends the Federal Banker's Acceptance Law. 48 U.S.
banks now face fewer limits on their ability to issue banker's acceptances, a low
risk form of export financing that is particularly beneficial to small and medium-
sized exporters. Hopefully, all of the provisions of Title II will result in greater
sources of financing for small, medium, and large U.S. exporters.
4. Titles III and IV of the Export Trading Company Act of 1982
At the turn of the century, major U.S. antitrust statutes were passed to prevent
monopolization, price-fixing, and other conduct considered harmful to a free
market system. The underlying legislative intent was to protect the consumer
from practices against which he could not protect himself. Since then, U.S.
exporters have worried that U.S. antitrust statutes might be enforced against them
even though their activities were carried out solely in the international markets.
This was of particular concern to U.S. companies competing in the domestic
market and desiring to join forces solely for collective export-related activities.
Given the inconsistent stress placed on antitrust enforcement over the last sixty
years, the fears of U.S. exporters are understandable.4 9 While some legal schol-
ars suggest that the U.S. antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act, should
reach any and all restrictive conduct by U.S. firms outside the United States,
other scholars reject this position.5 0 In 1977, the Antitrust Division of the United
States Department of Justice attempted to clarify its own inconsistent pronounce-
ments by issuing the Antitrust Guide for International Operations." The Guide
affirmed the Department of Justice's position that the Sherman Act does not give
U.S. courts jurisdiction over challenges to restrictive conduct of U.S. companies
occurring entirely outside of the United States if that conduct does not affect
either U.S. consumers or U.S. exporters. Unfortunately, federal judges and
juries have not always given the law the interpretation that the Guide suggests.
Titles III and IV of ETCA are two totally distinct legislative attempts to deal
with the antitrust concerns of U.S. exporters. Title IV, known as the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982,52 had its roots in a bill introduced in
the House of Representatives by Congressman Peter Rodino. Congressman
Rodino believed that the concerns of U.S. exporters regarding the application of
U.S. antitrust laws could be solved by amending certain antitrust statutes to state
47. The Small Business Administration Export Revolving Line of Credit Program.
48. 12 U.S.C. § 372 (1982).
49. The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982), offering only a defense in
litigation, is no comfort to exporters and may be considered a failure. The paucity of active Webb-
Pomerene Associations is proof of this.
50. See Rahl, Antitrust and International Transactions-Recent Developments, 46 ANTITRUST
L.J. 965 (1978); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is Covered?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1974).
51. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS (1977).
52. 15 U.S.C. § I note (1982).
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specifically when they applied to international conduct. Section 402 of ETCA53
adds a new section to the Sherman Act:
This Act shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import
trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations or a person
engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of this Act, other than
this section.
If this Act applies to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph
(1)(B), then this Act shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in
the United States.
The Sherman Act now contains an objective test to determine permissible
international conduct. A similar amendment to section 5(a) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is contained in Title IV.14 This amendment deals with unfair
methods of competition, but apparently does not limit the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's consumer protection jurisdiction which falls within the "unfair... acts or
practices ...affecting commerce." 55 A similar attempt to amend section 7 of
the Clayton Act was defeated in conference before ETCA became law. This is
unfortunate given the growing importance of joint ventures in the international
arena and the potential applicability of section 7. Therefore, while Title IV has
helped clarify the scope of U.S. antitrust laws affecting exporters, it is still not a
safe harbor. This increases the importance of the protections available under Title
III that are independent of Title IV.
Title III of ETCA took a different and more helpful direction. Originating in
legislation sponsored by Senator Heinz,56 Title III sets up a procedure whereby a
U.S. citizen, a U.S. company, a trade association, or a group of U.S. companies
may request a Certificate of Review-essentially a written guarantee or insurance
policy from the United States government affirming that the certified export-
related activities will not be subject to the threat of criminal or private treble-
damage antitrust lawsuits. 57 A Certificate of Review is only issued by the Secre-
tary of Commerce with the concurrence of the U.S. Attorney General. The
Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General apply four standards of review
to export activities to decide whether the conduct is certifiable. 58 ETCA provides
that an application must either be approved or denied within 90 days after it is
submitted. 59 To date, the application process has moved smoothly and stayed
within the 90 day statutory limit.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982).
55. H.R. REP. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2487, 2493.
56. See supra note 35.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 4016 (1982).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 4013 (a) (1-4) (1982).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 4013 (b) (1982).
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The first Certificate of Review was granted on October 25, 1983 .
60 Some
Certificates of Review have allowed U.S. companies to legally engage in export-
related activities that would normally trigger Justice Department or Federal 'Tade
Commission sanctions if carried out in the United States. Early applications have
already dealt with complex issues such as exchanging trade and price informa-
tion, establishing uniform prices among horizontal competitors, allocating inter-
national markets among competitors, and exchanging information in connection
with bidding international projects.
The possibility of obtaining a Certificate of Review immunizing export ac-
tivities from antitrust laws is a significant opportunity for U.S. exporters. In
addition to limiting antitrust fears, a Certificate of Review encourages the sharing
of risks and costs of exporting by like-minded companies. All U.S. companies
and trade associations would be well-advised to examine the protection offered
by certification.
III. CONCLUSION
In the 1980s, the United States remains the world's single largest market for
goods and services. Aside from the exceptions carved out by trade laws, entry
into the U.S. market for many foreign imports is relatively unrestricted. On the
export side, too few companies account for too large a percentage of U.S.
exports. The spiraling federal budget deficit and a strong U.S. dollar are only
partly to blame. An increase in the broadest possible range of U.S. exports of
goods and services appears to offer the best hope for victory in the trade deficit
battle.
Those who advocate the implementation of a national industrial policy that
selects a few key industrial sectors for major attention play a dangerous game.
Accurate predictions of worldwide industrial and service demands in the next
century are difficult, if not impossible, to make. A wrong guess could be cata-
strophic. For this reason, a centralized export-targeting process must be avoided.
Small and medium-sized companies have to be led, enticed, and coerced into
exporting to overseas markets. The Export Trading Company Act is an example
of narrowly tailored legislation designed to provide incentives to all potential
exporters. It attempts to remove the two major roadblocks to U.S. exports-
unavailability of financial resources for exporters and the spectre of U.S. antitrust
laws. Nevertheless, additional federal initiatives are needed to strengthen ETCA
and to deal with problems ETCA does not address. At a minimum, four pro-
posals deserve immediate evaluation by Congress:
(1) Title IV of ETCA, which is currently deficient in two aspects, should be
amended. First, section 7 of the Clayton Act 6' should be amended so that interna-
60. The first recipient was International Marketing & Procurement Services, Inc., a Pennsylvania
corporation in the sports leisure business selling U.S. products in Saudi Arabia and other areas of the
Middle East.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982).
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tional joint ventures involving U.S. companies will be freer to operate. 62 Second,
Title IV should specifically exclude the possibility of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion asserting its consumer protection jurisdiction to challenge extraterritorial
activities of U.S. companies.
(2) Title III of ETCA, which now authorizes the issuance of antitrust Certifi-
cates of Review for U.S. exporters, should be liberalized. Congress should
eliminate all civil liability as long as one holding a certificate acts within the four
corners of that certificate. Title III should also make it clear that its immunities
protect all employees, directors, officers, agents and shareholders of the Appli-
cant. Currently, the U.S. Government does not extend Certificate of Review
exemption to unnamed agents and export intermediaries of a certificate holder.
This runs counter to congressional purpose. In short, the broader the scope of
protection offered by a Certificate of Review, the greater the incentive for U.S.
companies to seek certification under Title III.
(3) Title I1 of ETCA should also be liberalized. The present statutory level of
permissible investment (five percent) and lending limits (ten percent) for bank
holding companies ought to be eliminated. Congress at the same time should
direct the Federal Reserve to rethink its strict collateral requirements regulating
bank-affiliated trading operations. While some regulatory oversight by the
Federal Reserve is appropriate, too great a federal role is a major disincentive to
many U.S. banks who might otherwise venture into this area. The greater in-
volvement of regional and small financial institutions is truly needed, not just the
involvement of large money center banks.
(4) U.S. tax laws should be amended to encourage exports by U.S. companies,
particularly the smaller to medium-sized ones. Until recently, a tax deferral was
available to U.S. exporters through the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC). The Deficit Reduction Act of 198463 replaced the DISC with the Foreign
Sales Corporation (FSC). Unfortunately for U.S. companies wishing to export,
the benefits available under FSC are less than those originally available under
DISC. Meaningful tax incentives are necessary as a true incentive to produce
greater numbers and types of U.S. exporters. Congress must revisit the entire
issue of tax benefits for exporters.
U.S. companies must want to export. To make this happen, businessmen and
politicians must understand that the trade deficit is a serious, non-partisan prob-
lem and that the long-term economic viability of the U.S. economy is dependent
on increased export of a wide variety of products and services. Genuine coopera-
tion between the White House, Congress, business, labor, and consumers is a
prerequisite. This can only be accomplished through leadership and not politics.
The Export Trading Company Act is an important step in that direction.
62. This amendment was proposed in the Rodino bill, H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1982).
The language which was to be added reads: "This section shall not apply to the formation or operation
of any joint venture limited to commerce other than import commerce with foreign nations." Id.
63. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
